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Abstract 
This paper studies the effect of political variables on the gains obtained by Spanish 
regions in periodical bargaining of the intergovernmental financing agreements and on 
the regional distribution of discretional earmarked grants over the period 1987-2008. 
First, we find that the relationship between gains in transferred revenues and on 
regional public debt stocks depends on the period and the specific issues discussed in 
the corresponding negotiation, aside from political affinity. Second, we show that the 
most discretional program of earmarked grants is strongly driven by electoral strategy. 
National incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers where there are 
competitive regional elections. Moreover, we show that earmarked grants are allocated 
in those regions where the incumbent performs better in national elections and, 
especially, in those where there are more seats to be won. Hence we prove that both 
strategies are complementary rather than exclusive.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A growing body of literature argues that intergovernmental grants in fiscal 
federalism tend to be allocated according to political interests (Khemani, 2007: 465). 
Public agents face important incentives in order to use public investment strategically. 
Nevertheless, the disagreement relies on the implemented strategy. A first set of authors 
have argued that in districted electoral systems, intergovernmental grants will be 
allocated in those regions in which there are more seats apportioned (Gibson et al., 
1999; Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001; Samuels and Snyder, 2001; Rodden, 2002; Hoover 
and Pecorino, 2005; Pitlik at al., 2006). Other authors have posited that 
intergovernmental grants will be allocated exclusively depending on the presence of the 
same party in charge of the subnational unit (Khemani, 2003, 2007). Finally, another 
strand of literature has focused on how an electoral race is the central element driving 
the levels of government investment, whether it is centered on their own strongholds 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986) or in breaking a tie in a constituency (Lindbeck and 
Weibull (1993; Dixit and Londregan, 1996, 1998; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). 
 
Previous studies have been specially focused on the incentives encouraging 
different strategies. However, there still important efforts to be made in two analytical 
vectors. First, political strategies dealing with intergovernmental grants require 
considering together the interaction of electoral outcomes and institutional context 
(León-Alfonso, 2007). Second, the subnational level of competition has received less 
attention in comparison to the national one. The focus has been particularly centered on 
political affinity among levels of government (Khemani, 2003; 2007) but the role 
played by regional elections has not been directly addressed.  
 
Spain provides a perfect case study to deal with these challenges. First, it is an 
evolving federation characterized up to now by periodical bargaining on its fiscal 
federal framework. The main issue discussed each time is the amount of total revenues 
for regions and the criteria to distribute it among those regions. By and large, the main 
sources of revenues for regional governments are grants (both unconditional and 
conditional) and tax sharings. Second, Spain is one country with substantial variance in 
district magnitude across constituencies in national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002), 
so it presents a significant within-country variation in incentives for resource allocation. 
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Finally, the case of Spain is puzzling. Despite the theoretical expectations, political 
variables have not been proven especially relevant in some pieces of research (Lago-
Peñas, 2005; Gómez-Reino y Herrero, 2011) or at best there has been mixed evidence in 
others (Jarocinska, 2006; León-Alfonso, 2007). 
 
This paper is an effort addressed to integrate the different explanations of 
intergovernmental transfers. We focus on two different elements determining resource 
allocation: gains of Autonomous Communities (ACs) or regions in the periodical 
bargaining of its financing system and the most discretional program of earmarked 
grants: investment agreements made by the central government with subnational 
entities
2
.  
 
In this paper we show that no political variables affect the relative regional gains 
in bargaining, aside from the impact of public debt in some cases. In particular, only in 
the fourth system reform regional public debt stock was positively correlated with the 
gains in the financing system. Hence we show that the mechanism linking debt with 
higher transfers does not operate automatically and in a universal sense. We also show 
that intergovernmental transfers in the case of Spain are driven by the electoral interests 
of the national incumbent, but the preferred strategy is different depending on incentives 
provided by each level of competition. On the one hand, earmarked grants tend to be 
allocated in regions where there is a narrow margin of victory in regional elections, 
back-warding the idea of tactical investment centered on swing regions (Dahlberg and 
Johansson, 2002). On the other hand, incumbents tend to devote grants in those regions 
where they have better results at the national level, especially in those where there are 
more seats allocated, so they follow a “take care of your own” strategy (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986; León-Alfonso, 2007). Then, both strategies are followed 
simultaneously by a political center interested in maximizing its chances in national 
elections and securing as many subnational governments as possible. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, the literature on political 
use of intergovernmental transfers and public investment is surveyed. The main 
hypothesis that has been presented by the literature are discussed and connected with 
                                                          
2
 “Convenios de inversion” in Spanish. 
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the Spanish case. In section 3 we present the variables used, the specifications and the 
econometric methodology. The next section summarizes the empirical results and 
discusses their substantive implications. Section 5 concludes.  
 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
A growing body of political economy literature has been centered on how 
incumbents use intergovernmental transfers for strategic purposes. The central idea of 
this approach is that political parties and candidates use redistributive policies as an 
instrument in order to maximize their electoral results, aside from other normative or 
efficiency considerations. This approach involves two assumptions. First, it assumes 
that politicians are mainly self-interested rent-seekers and they principally care about 
(re) election. Second, it assumes that voters are mainly interested in the private 
consumption derived from public policies investment.
3
 Based on those premises, the 
literature has investigated the political determinants driving this strategic use of 
transfers. 
The first element that has been addressed is the (un)equal territorial distribution 
of political representation. According to this argument, Samuels and Snyder (2001) 
pointed out that policy agenda can be shaped by the level of malapportionment in the 
electoral system. This bias refers to those situations in which there are a mismatch 
between the share of legislative seats and the shares of population in a given district or 
region. As a consequence, the payoffs in terms of representation are altered depending 
on the region and politicians that want to take advantage of it. “In malapportioned 
systems, executives may thus face powerful incentives to build policy coalitions based 
on the ‘cheap’ support (for example, in terms of pork per vote) of legislators from 
overrepresented districts.” (Samuels and Snyder, 2001: 667). Therefore, there are good 
reasons for expecting investment and transfers to over-represented districts. 
This hypothesis has been addressed in different studies. Porto and Sanguinetti 
(2001) analyzed the effect of districts over-representation in Argentina’s Congress in 
                                                          
3
 It is important to remind that depending on the author it holds under any circumstance (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1987) or it can be balanced by other elements such as partisan orientation (Dahlberg and 
Johansson, 2002)  
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intergovernmental transfers. They showed that the federal government has tended to 
allocate over time important and continuing investments in those districts 
overrepresented in the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Similar studies have 
addressed this hypothesis considering the potential impact of the partisanship variable 
(Gibson et al., 1999) but it did not introduce changes concerning the main argument: the 
assemblies’ apportionment determines the strategic use of investment and transfers. 
Evidence has supported this argument in other contexts. Hoover and Pecorino (2005) 
analyzed the impact of disproportional representation in federal expenditures in the 
United States. Rodden (2002) followed a similar logic in the study of EU redistribution 
among countries and Pitlik at al. (2006) found that malapportionment in the upper 
house in Germany leads to disproportional states share of per capita transfers among 
länders.  
However, this explanation fails to point out the mechanisms driving strategic 
allocation in those countries where the apportionment of the legislature is perfect. Does 
the incumbent strategic allocation argument no longer hold? The literature has offered 
two competing theoretical arguments. 
The first model is based on the theoretical background presented by Cox and 
McCubbins (1986). They divide voters into three different groups: support voters, 
opposition voters and swing voters. According to their conception, electoral politics is 
viewed as a two person game in which candidates’ attitude towards risk is the crucial 
factor driving the stability of redistributive politics. The authors apply the same logic as 
in an investment. They argue that risk-adverse candidates will prefer to invest, 
especially in core supporters because they can expect a clear return in terms of electoral 
support. On the contrary, candidates’ expectation of electoral support is lower among 
swing voters and even lower among opposition groups so they will allocate little 
investment in those groups. This strategy is based on the mobilization of the core voters 
of a party and has been labeled as “Hold what you got” or “Take care of your own” 
(Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383). 
The second theoretical model has deserved more attention explaining strategic 
allocation of transfers. This framework is based on papers by Lindbeck and Weibull 
(1993), Dixit and Londregan (1996, 1998) and Dahlberg and Johansson (2002). Those 
studies are focused on testing the “swing voters” and “core voters” approach to 
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redistributive politics. For those voters considered as political moderate, those with no 
preferences on parties’ manifestos, differences in resource allocation can be decisive in 
voting decision. It is the contrary in the case of core voters, who have a stronger party 
attachment and to which resource allocation plays little role. Assuming difference in 
preferences among the two groups, incumbents will invest resources in districts until 
reaching the specific point in which swing voters decide to vote for them. Dahlberg and 
Johansson (2002: 30) developed the idea further considering that low income voters 
have a higher marginal utility derived from income and thus, they can be persuaded to 
vote for the party providing them with more transfers. Then, the idea is to expect low 
income regions to receive higher transfers. 
According to the density of the investment cut point, under some assumptions 
about the distribution
4
, there will be a correspondence with the closeness of the last 
election (Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002). Therefore, the hypothesis suggested 
according to this argument is the opposite of the previous one. In those districts where 
there is higher competitiveness in an electoral contest, the marginal utility of public 
investment will also be higher. As a result, swing states will be the primary target of 
strategic resource allocation. Studies dealing with this hypothesis have been centered on 
those programs fulfilling some conditions: Intergovernmental grants have to be 
dependent on the incumbent decision, the investment should be disentangled from 
efficiency and equity criteria, resources can be easily connected to an election and 
voters can identify if they have (not) been rewarded. The more recent evidence has been 
centered on Swedish intergovernmental transfer programs to municipalities, which 
fulfill the previous conditions (Johansson, 2003; Dahlberg and Johansson, 2002) and 
have proven the robustness of the hypothesis. 
The study by Boex and Martinez-Vázquez (2005) distinguished several 
explanatory models in order to establish the institutional mechanism of grant allocation. 
However, they considered different case studies together and found a high consistency 
in the role played by political factors driving it. In that which concerns the political 
allocation of resources, they stressed the voter choice model; the allocation of 
intergovernmental grants will be distributed to local governments in accordance with 
the fiscal preferences of the median voter. On the other hand, they also underline the 
                                                          
4
 The assumption are symmetry and a single-peakedness distribution. 
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important literature centered on institutional elements, especially regarding the 
hypothesis that “subnational government with powerful political interests can be 
expected to receive larger intergovernmental grants” (Boex and Martinez-Vázquez, 
2005: 7). In a similar way, Veiga and Pinho study (2005) showed that specific local 
considerations matters. They proved that the longer the time span of the mayor in office, 
the more funds are transferred to his/her municipality. They also introduce the relevance 
of political timing, pointing out that grants increase in election years.  
Therefore, interaction between central and subnational has been also pointed out 
as a crucial variable. Literature has suggested that intergovernmental transfers can be 
directly related with the incentives that an “opportunistic center” has to guarantee that 
his party controls the state government. Khemani (2003) studied the case of Indian 
federalism and argued that state governments are key bases in order to secure the 
incumbent party support at the national election because states can use instruments such 
as patronage in order to boost incumbents´ political support. Therefore “National 
governments have political incentives to ensure that their party controls state 
governments, for which purpose it attempts to bias the distribution of national resources 
to political affiliated states” (Khemani, 2003: 9). This argument has been proven when 
Khemani shown that states in India belonging to the same party have higher deficits that 
are entirely financed by loans and transfers from the central government. In posterior 
research about India, Khemani (2007) proved that intergovernmental transfers are 
targeted to a particular type of partisan states. In specific, Khemani pointed out that 
“transfers determined by the political agency are greater to those co-partisan states 
where the party controls a smaller proportion of districts or seats allotted to the state in 
the national legislature” (Khemani, 2007: 466).  
The Spanish case offers a perfect case study to test the strategic allocation of 
investments and intergovernmental grants for two reasons. The Spanish Constitution 
allowed a decentralization of the country which led to the creation of 17 Autonomous 
Communities (ACs). Due to historical and political reasons, two opposite financing 
systems emerged. Two ACs (the Basque country and Navarre), collect all taxes in their 
territories and transfer a part to the central state depending on its service provision. On 
the contrary, grants (both unconditional and conditional) and, in a lesser extent, tax 
sharing, have been, by and large, the main source of revenues for the remaining 15 ACs. 
8 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
Agreements on those instruments involve periodical renegotiation and opening up the 
possibility of rent-seeking (Lago-Peñas, 2005: 442).  
There is a second reason to use Spain as a case study. A number of studies have 
been centered on how the electoral system can shape incentives towards public 
spending, the size of the government or the levels of redistribution (Persson and 
Tabellini, 2003; Boex and Martínez-Vazquez, 2005; Iversen and Soskice, 2006). 
However, little attention has been paid to how the electoral system can shape the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers within a given country. According to previous 
arguments, the potential electoral gain for national incumbents can have a crucial 
mediating effect that could shape the optimal level of resource allocation to “take care 
of your own”. This potential electoral revenue is captured by district magnitude. Spain 
is one country with important variance in district magnitude across constituencies in 
national elections (Monroe and Rose, 2002) and this can make the difference. The idea 
is that the marginal utility of intergovernmental transfers can be higher in those regions 
in which a higher number of national seats are allocated. Thus, this idea can only be 
tested in countries in which there is important variance in district magnitude in the 
national electoral system like the case of Spain. 
The research dealing with the Autonomous Communities is scarce in general. In 
Lago-Peñas (2005) this topic is partially addressed in the discussion of regional debt 
bailout. Some evidence suggests that political affinity helps to explain the size of per 
capita investment agreements in those regions under the common financing system 
during the period between 1992-1996 and the relative gains in the financing system in 
1991 (not in 1986). Nevertheless, those results should be considered with caution. The 
coefficients are statistically significant at a 10% level, the sample discards temporal-
series analysis because it uses averages calculated between 1986-1996, and, 
fundamentally, the political affinity variable is roughly measured.  It is considered that 
an autonomous community has political affinity if, during the period 1986-1996, the 
majority of years the party in office has been the same as the national incumbent PSOE.  
 
In the case of investment agreements, Jarocinska (2006) discarded the relevance 
of political variables on its distribution over the period 1986-1996. However, in the case 
of direct transfers of the central state managed by the Autonomous Communities, she 
found that political affinity between regional and national government does not involve 
 On the Political Determinants of Intergovernmental Grants in Decentralized Countries 9 
 
more per capita resources. However, it affects voters’ loyalty because the percentage of 
“swing voters” is a relevant explanatory factor. The research of Leon-Alfonso (2007) 
provides evidence about the relevance of swing voters and partisan affinity. Her main 
contribution is centered on pointing out how the relative importance of both 
components changes with the institutional design. The lower the decentralization is, the 
more important the role played by partisan affinity and the less important the role 
played by swing voters. Gomez-Reino and Herrero (2011) change the scope and center 
their interest on explaining the annual evolution of the several grant programs to 
regions. Despite analyzing different political factors such as the affinity in the party 
ruling both levels, electoral margins, legislative agreements of single-minority 
governments at the national level with subnational parties or the incumbent electoral 
support in ACs, none of them proved to be statistically significant.  
 
Our contribution is threefold. First, the gains in ordinary and regulated resources 
in reform moments are analyzed. Second, we estimate more complete specifications 
including political and economic mechanisms. Finally, we pay special attention to 
econometric methodology, especially to time series dynamics.  
  
 
3. VARIABLES, DATA, SPECIFICATIONS, AND ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 
 In order to test the systematic influence of the previously mentioned variables on 
the Autonomous Communities´ resource distribution, we focus on those instruments in 
which their influence should be clearest: Revisions of ordinary ACs´ financing system 
and earmarked grants from central administration to regional governments. Insofar as 
the dynamics of the former is ruled out by exogenous and common cross-region growth 
rates, it makes sense to not focus on the intra-period dynamic. 
 
 Therefore, two different endogenous variables will be analyzed. First, the gains 
(GAIN) obtained by each of the 15 Autonomous Communities under the common 
financing system
5
 on successive negotiation periods (1986-1991; 1992-1996; 2002-
2008; 2009-2013). Second, the so-called “investment agreements”; earmarked grants 
                                                          
5
 The Basque Country and Navarre have their own financing system, bilaterally negotiated between the 
central government and each of the regions.  
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distributed on a project basis (G). As clarified above, these agreements are the grants 
category that can be more discretionally assigned by the central government. The first 
variable is expressed in percentages while the second is in Euros per capita.  
 
The explanatory variables considered are the following: 
 
1. The first set of political variables tries to capture the extent to which the 
national incumbent is centered on “taking care of your own” (Cox and 
McCubbins, 1986). The variable NAT measures the vote share obtained by the 
party in national government on each autonomous community. This variable 
takes into account national electoral cycle (PSOE until 1996; PP 1996-2004 and 
PSOE since then). If it is confirmed that national governments allocate more 
intergovernmental transfers in those communities where they do better, the 
optimal allocation threshold should be greater in those regions where there are a 
higher marginal utility, that is, in those where more seats are allocated.  
Therefore, if national votes prove to be statistically significant, we will test the 
interaction of NAT and the percentage of seats of the lower chamber “Congreso 
de los Diputados” allocated in each Autonomous Community (MG). On the 
other hand, the REG variable measures the vote share of the national party in 
regional elections. For both NAT and REG variables, lagged values are used in 
order to capture the idea that the national incumbent will reward those districts 
where it received more votes in previous election. For the same both variables 
(NAT-1 and REG-1) the expected coefficient is positive; the national incumbent 
will be allocated more transfers where he received more votes.  
  
Third, we introduce in the specification political affinity (POLAF) between 
national and subnational incumbents (Khemani, 2003, 2007)
6
.  This variable is 
defined in a different way in specifications [1] and [2] presented below. In 
specification [1] the variable is coded 1 if there are the same party in national 
and subnational government when the agreement is signed and 0 otherwise
7
. In 
                                                          
6
 In the case of coalition governments at the regional level, we consider that there are political affinities if 
at least one of its members has the same political colour as the national incumbent.  
7
We can include both this variable and individual fixed-effect thanks to the existence of asymmetries in 
elections cycles in the different Autonomous Communities. On the contrary, we have to set aside those 
variables in the case of the equation for GAIN due to the low within-variation inclusion. We also check to 
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the case of investment agreements we adopt more severe criteria. Variable is 
coded 1 when the same parties are in both governments during both the passing 
and execution phases of the budgetary process. Additionally, we test if political 
affinity effect is stronger in electoral years (Veiga and Pinho, 2005).We have 
defined an EL variable, which has value 1 in those years where national 
elections are held and 0 otherwise. In the econometric specification we include 
the interaction of POLAF and EL as well as the constitutive terms of the 
interaction in order to avoid biases in the coefficients (Brambor et al, 2006)
8
. 
  
2. The second set of variables is centered on the extent to which national 
incumbents devote their investment efforts in those regions where there are more 
swing voters (Lindbeck y Weibull, 1993; Dixit y Londregan, 1996, 1998; 
Dahlberg y Johansson, 2002). We have measured regions as swing depending on 
the electoral competitiveness according to Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and 
using the raw margin of votes between the first and the second party (v1-v2) 
(Söderlund et al., 2011). The DISN variable measures the vote share difference 
between first and second party at the national level in a given community.  The  
DISR variable calculates the same difference but centered on the regional arena. 
The interpretation of the variables is the reverse of our hypothesis.  The higher 
this variable is the less competitive is the election in this region and, as 
consequence, lower intergovernmental transfers and gains of financing system is 
expected.  
 
3. The last set of political variables is related to the electoral gain of territories 
receiving transfers. On the one hand, more demographic weight involves more 
importance in the national parliament. Figure 1 shows the strong correlation 
between population share and seats allocated (Ceuta and Melilla are not 
considered). It presents a scatter plot combining both elements, the regression 
line and the curve derived from the use of a non-parametric technique (lowess 
linear fit). It gives a higher weight to the observations closer to each point. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
define the variable in alternative ways, coding 1 in pre-election years and 0 otherwise; and also coding 1 
in both electoral and pre-electoral years, and 0 otherwise.  Results did not significantly change 
8
 In the case of the interaction between NAT and MG, the latter is not included as independent regressor 
because its within-variation is close o zero and then multicollinearity with individual fixed effects was 
extremely high.   
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Linear correlation is positive and very strong (r = +0.97). However, this 
relationship is not exactly proportional. Less populated regions tend to be over-
represented in the Parliament. This fact is graphically represented by a 
regression line starting over the bisectrix of the quadrant and ending below it. 
9
. 
Therefore, more populated territories are more relevant in order to secure the 
national incumbent re-election despite the vote/ seat ratio tending to be higher. 
In electoral terms, according to the logic of strategic investment in case of 
malapportionment, more resources in small territories are allocated. Non 
parametric adjustment shows that this logic is not exactly the same in the case of 
AC; they have a population of about 6 and 13% of the total caused by the 
diversity in the number of provinces. Therefore, we have introduced two extra 
variables in the estimates. The variable POPSHARE is defined as the population 
share of each autonomous community. Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded. 
Basque Country and Navarre are not considered in the specification centered on 
explaining the gains of the financing system. The second variable SEATS 
measures the relative share of seats of the Congress allocated in each 
autonomous community. Ceuta and Melilla have been excluded again. 
 
4. Finally, we have included an economic variable: debt stocks of regional 
governments (D). This inclusion is justified according to the literature centered 
on bailout to regional governments (Lago-Peñas, 2005). A positive and 
statistically significant coefficient would mean that there are implicit bailouts to 
those regional governments with more debt. The variable is expressed in 
thousands of Euros per capital. We have considered the value at the end of the 
previous year to the financing reform or the implementation of the investment 
agreements. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 This territorial proportionality deviation is due to the minimum of two seats per province established by 
electoral law. Ceuta and Melilla have one seat each. According to this division, 102 of the 350 seats of the 
Congress are fixed by province. The remaining 248 seats are distributed on a provincial basis according to 
their population.    
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Figure 1: Relationship between population shares and seats. 
 Aggregated data for regions in 1996  
 
 
Sources: INE (www.ine.es), Ministerio del Interior (http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/) and own 
elaboration.  
 
 Data sources are the following. Population data have been obtained from the 
National Statistics Institute of Spain (www.ine.es). Data on investment agreements are 
taken from BADESPE (www.ief.es). Data is available for the period 1986-2001. To 
measure the regional gains involved by bargaining on the financing system we rely 
upon the estimates by Utrilla (2002) for the reforms driving the periods 1987-1991, 
1992-1996 and 2002-2008 and by Bosch (2011) for the period starting in 2009
10
. 
Electoral and political data are gathered from the official webpage of the Home 
Ministry (http://www.interior.gob.es/) and the several sites from this webpage devoted 
to national and regional elections.  
 
Econometric Specifications and methodology 
 
The following three econometric specifications are estimated:  
 
                                                          
10
 In the reform for the period 1997-2001 there were no increases in resources transferred to regions. 
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In all cases, subindex i and t indicate region and year, respectively, and ε is a white-
noise random error. Individual fixed-effects are included in both specifications [1] and 
[2]. Time fixed-effects to account for common shocks are included in specification [3]. 
 
 In the case of the endogenous variable GAIN, four cross-sections are merged 
yielding 60 observations (15*4). Insofar as both time and cross-section dimensions of 
the sample are small, the use of specific panel data or time-series cross-section (TSCS) 
econometric techniques is discarded. On the contrary, we rely on OLS estimators, 
replacing standard residuals by general-form heteroskedasticty robust errors. Finally, 
according to the Breusch-Godfrey autocorrelation test, there are no problems in this 
respect. All the estimates are performed using the software Eviews 7.2.  
 
In the case of specification [2] the first step is the analysis of the data generator 
process (DGP) of variable G. Hence several unit root tests were performed. One of the 
tests assumes the existence of common unit roots (Levin. Lin y Chu). The rest of them   
assume the existence of idiosyncratic unit roots (Im, Pesaran y Shin, Fisher-PP, Fisher-
ADF). In all cases, intercepts and time trends were included to avoid specification 
biases. Results are straightforward. Variable G is I (0) or stationary: p-values were well 
below 0.01 in all cases. The straight consequence of this result is that the specification is 
formulated with the variables expressed in levels. Both time and individual fixed-effect 
are included in the specification. In the first case, it accounts for common shocks. In the 
second case, we test for the existence of systematic biases in the allocation of resources 
to the different regions
11
. In this case the extremely low within-variation of both 
POPSHARE and SEATS leads to a serious multicollinearity problem with individual 
fixed-effects. For this reason, both variables are dropped from the specification, and a 
                                                          
11
Performed formal tests backed up the need of introducing both sorts of fixed-effects. 
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second analysis is performed. Residuals are regressed on population shares to check if 
both variables are related. This is the logics of specification [3]. In order to deal with 
both heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlations in the random error, OLS 
standard errors are replaced by PCSE. Concerning autocorrelation, the first order 
coefficient was very low, around 0.2 and hence not a concern.  
 
RESULTS 
 
Tables 1 and 2 report the main descriptive statistics for the variables in 
specifications [1] and [2]. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of variables in Equation [1]. Stacked data 
 GAIN NAT POLAF  D 
Mean 7.27 44.89 0.62 0.53 
Median 6.40 44.05 1.00 0.40 
Maximum 32.10 60.70 1.00 2.43 
Minimum 0.80 22.80 0.00 0.00 
Standard Deviation 5.33 7.78 0.49 0.55 
Observations 60 60 60 60 
Cross sections 15 15 15 15 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics of variables in equations [2] and [3]. Stacked data 
 G DISR DISN NAT REG POLAF EL POLAF *EL POPSHARE SEATS D 
Mean 14.24 12.45 10.60 41.39 38.44 0.51 0.26 0.099 0.058 9.58 0.39 
Median 10.16 12.01 9.20 40.80 39.46 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.040 9.15 0.33 
Maximum 131.85 32.73 34.40 58.10 54.28 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.18 15.38 1.62 
Minimum 0.006 0.150 0.20 18.00 9.51 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.006 6.32 0.000 
Standard Deviation 14.86 7.574 8.11 8.93 10.11 0.50 0.44 0.30 0.049 2.08 0.37 
Number of Observations 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 272 
Number of cross sections 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 
 
 
Table 3 summarizes the estimates of specification [1]. In the first column none 
of the variables are statistically significant at the standard levels despite variable D 
being marginally significant. In order to analyze in more detail the effect of this 
variable, it is interacted with a set of four dummy variables (T1 to T4). Variable T1 is 
coded 1 for observations corresponding to the first reform and 0 otherwise, and so on. 
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Results provide interesting evidence. During the eighties, when debt stocks were low, 
this variable does not matter at all. This situation changes in the ´90s. The variable 
displays a p-value near 10%. In the next decade the effect is statistically significant at a 
5% level. The most surprising is the change in the coefficient sign between the third and 
fourth reforms. In terms of Spanish GDP, the average autonomic debt was almost the 
same in the time of both reforms, but the coefficient is negative in the first case and 
positive in the second
12
. Why is it that in one period that the higher the debt of the 
autonomous community, the higher the gains received, while in the second period the 
opposite is true?  
 
Table 3: Econometric estimates of equation [1] 
Intercept 1.47 
(0.26) 
8.68 
(1.49) 
NAT-1 0.09 
(0.75) 
-0.08 
(0.65) 
POLAF  0.06 
(0.04) 
1.75 
(0.93) 
D-1 3.47 
(1.52)  
D-1 *T1 
 
33.57 
(0.65) 
D-1 *T2 
 
11.75 
(1.59) 
D-1 *T3 
 
-5.95** 
(2.10) 
D-1 *T4 
 
5.35** 
(2.16) 
Number of observations 60 60 
R
2
 0.488 0.572 
Notes: Estimates include both individual and time fixe-effects. Computed t-statistics are robust to general form 
heteroskedasticity. ** means statistical significance at 5% level. 
 
 
First, reforms of federal financial relationships are based on multilateral 
bargaining between the central government and autonomous communities. 
Nevertheless, the demographic and electoral importance of Catalonia and its strong 
preference in favor of decentralization made this region the main agent in negotiations. 
The financial system reforms have depended to a higher extent on the parliamentary 
majorities in the Congress and the extent to which Catalan nationalist parties were 
decisive in the support of the national incumbent (Leon-Alfonso, 2008: 218). This 
factor was crucial in 2009 negotiations. The national government was a single majority 
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 Linear simple correlation between both variables for the reform passed in 2001 is -0.41 
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party in parliament and it depended on the support of Catalan parties´ MPs. Therefore, 
the central government was a much weaker player during this period.   
 
Second, until 2001 those Autonomous Communities with more debt were the 
ones with higher levels of decentralization and powers, especially those with higher per 
capita GDP: the less developed (Galicia and Andalusia) enjoyed higher per capita 
budgets thanks to grants from both Spanish and European regional policy (Lago-Peñas, 
2005 and 2006). The 2001 financing reform was in the middle of an expansive cycle 
and the problems related with the management of deficits, debt and fiscal consolidation 
were not a priority. The core of this reform was centered on the transference of health 
care systems in 10 AC, which, as was said, were the ones with lower debt stocks (Ruiz-
Huerta and Herrero, 2004). The health care system was, in fact, the main element 
driving the reform. “Health care financing is one of the main difficulties in the 
negotiation of the new model (…) This competence will involve important amounts of 
spending, so AC’s are demanding that the national government provides guarantees 
enough that health care administration will not be a total disaster. The central 
government is in conditions of creating a fund with extra help to cover unplanned 
spending” 13. 
 
Nevertheless, in 2009 fiscal consolidation, debt and deficits were the key 
concerns. For example, the regional minister of finances from Catalonia argued that the 
economic crisis will reduce revenues and will create deficit. Nevertheless: “the 
[financing] system reform was necessary because it is structural, permanent, a new 
model affecting our income structure.  It is a qualitative change. A different thing is the 
economic crisis. Even with a better model we still have deficits because it happens 
everywhere, even to better financed states”. However the regional minister posited that: 
“The entry of 2.150 million of Euros in 2009 thanks to the new financing model will 
allow us to have fewer deficits than what we would have had with the other one” 14 .The 
fact that those AC with more debt had lower per capita financing allowed a relative 
improvement (Bosch, 2011). 
                                                          
13
 Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Friday, June 1 2001. p.19.  
14
 Newspaper “La Vanguardia”. Sunday, August 9 2009. pp-59-60. 
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Definitively, the mechanism linking debt with higher transfers does not seem to 
operate automatically and in a universal sense. It depends on the relative importance of 
subnational entities’ debt, the relative power of the central government and regions in 
debt and the problems or challenges addressed as priorities in each discussion about the 
allocation of funds. 
 
Estimates of specification [2] are reported in columns one to four of table 4. In 
column 5 the fixed effects estimated in the first column are regressed on variables with 
extremely low within-variation. Variables with statistical significance lower than 10% 
are EL, DISR and NAT. The variables DISR and NAT show the expected sign. Assuming 
that POLAF is included in the interaction, the negative coefficient of EL points out that 
regional elections affect negatively the implementation of agreements. 
 
Table 4: Econometric estimates of equations [2] and [3] 
Equation 
 
[2] [2] [2] [2] [3] 
Intercept 9.29 
(1.52) 
8.88 
(1.49) 
15.75** 
(2.11) 
10.62*** 
(3.15) 
-8.05 
(0.88) 
NAT-1 0.40* 
(1.94) 
0.25* 
(1.62) 
-0.24 
(0.79) 
  
NAT-1*MG   
 
0.05** 
(2.22) 
0.03*** 
(3.03) 
 
REG-1 -0.18 
(1.14) 
    
POLAF 3.08 
(1.06) 
2.49 
(0.92) 
3.22 
(1.14) 
2.77 
(1.09) 
 
EL -3.58* 
(1.84) 
-3.33* 
(1.72) 
-2.89 
(1.47) 
-3.17* 
(1.69) 
 
EL*POLAF 1.26 
(0.35) 
1.53 
(0.39) 
0.66 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.25) 
 
DISR -0.29** 
(2.24) 
-0.37*** 
(3.20) 
-0.33*** 
(2.96) 
-0.38*** 
(3.61) 
 
DISN -0.08 
(0.58) 
    
D-1 -0.002 
(0.39) 
-0.002 
(0.47) 
-0.001 
(0.28) 
-0.001 
(0.25) 
 
POPSHARE     9.450 
(0.28) 
SEATS     0.8 
(0.95) 
Number of 
observations 
272 272 272 272 17 
R
2
 0.476 0.474 0.481 0.480 0.06 
Notes: Estimates in columns 1 to 4 include both time and individual fixed-effects and rely on PCSE proposed by  
Beck and Katz (1995) to compute t-statistics. *, **, *** means statistical sighnificance at 10%, 5% y 1% levels, 
respectively. 
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The substantive explanation of EL effect is related with the implementation of 
the agreements, which tend to be lower in electoral years contrary to Veiga and Pinho’s 
(2005) hypothesis. The interaction of EL and POLAF is not statistically significant so it 
means that there is no special investment effort in electoral year in those communities 
with the same parties in national and regional governments.  The variable measuring the 
electoral distance between the first and the second party at the regional level DISR gives 
evidence in favor of the strategic investment of national governments in contested 
regions. The higher the electoral distance between the principal parties of the regional 
election (less competitive election), the lower is the investment in investment 
agreements. Therefore, the result is a higher level of investment in those AC where 
regional competition is important and the level of public investment can determine the 
final outcome of the election. The fact that REG-1 is not statistically significant 
confirms this idea.  
Nevertheless, the electoral distance of the two main parties at the national level 
in a given region does not affect G. On the contrary, the vote share of the party at the 
national level NAT-1 has a statistically significant effect, so there is a positive 
association of the gains and the results of the party in a given AC. Therefore, at the 
national level the preferred strategy is to “take care of your own”. When this variable 
interacts in the model with district magnitude it presents a positive and statistically 
significant result. This means that national incumbents do not “take care of their own” 
to the same extent in all regions but it is strategically determined by the potential seat 
gains of each region. The levels of investment will be higher in those regions where the 
national incumbents have more electoral support in previous election and have more 
seats at stake.  
This evidence points out that hypotheses about the strategic use of investment 
agreements are complementary; one or the other will be preferred depending on the kind 
of election. There exist different optimal investment thresholds depending on the 
electoral contest. In the case of regional elections the optimal level of provision depends 
on the strategy of maximize the possibilities of changing a swing region irrespective of 
the levels of support the national incumbent has. Nevertheless, in national elections the 
objective is different because the potential threshold of investment is higher. The 
objective is not to change swing regions (which do not affect the final result because 
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national constituencies are provinces) but mobilize the national incumbent strongholds 
as much as possible, especially those regions where more seats are allocated.  
The argument of strategic use of intergovernmental transfers is similar to the one 
by Khemani (2007) when he says that, among co-partisan states, the ones in which it is  
preferred to invest are those with a lower proportion of seats controlled by the national 
incumbent. There is a kind of swing states among those owned by the party. The 
argument of our interaction is partially different. In Spain there is an importance 
variance in district magnitude (Monroe and Rose, 2002). Therefore, the expected utility 
of investment will vary depending on the number of seats allocated. If a “take care of 
your own” strategy is assumed, the expected electoral revenue will be higher the more 
the seats that AC has. This explains the positive sign of the interactive effect. 
Finally, the variables POPSHARE and SEATS are not statistically significant. In 
the case of the second one the explanation can be related with the miss-adjustment 
between the AC and the district in national elections, the province. SEATS variable 
considers the share of MPs per capita of the AC. However, marginal seats linked with 
competitiveness (Blais and Lago, 2009) and malapportionment (Samuels and Snyder, 
2001) should be calculated at the provincial level. Therefore, it is possible that its 
insignificant effect is driven by this problem, impossible to be solved with available 
data. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
Political officials in evolving federations may be tempted to use 
intergovernmental transfers and grants with strategic purposes. However, there is still an 
important lack of understanding on the institutional settings driving that behavior and 
the preferred tactic. In this paper we have addressed two different policies related with 
territorial resource allocation form the center: the gains of the Spanish regions or 
Autonomous Communities in the periodical negotiations of their financing system and 
the most discretional earmarked grants made by the central government to regional 
governments. This paper tests whether political variables related with electoral contest 
and their interaction are relevant in explaining their relative assignment across 
territories. We have shown that gains in the system of financing are unrelated with 
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strategic use. The main factor driving those gains is regional public debt stocks. All in 
all the sign and magnitude of its effect depends on more factors, in particular the 
specific issues discussed in the inter-territorial negotiation.  
 
However, the situation is quite different in the case of the intergovernmental 
transfers. Our argument is that two crucial elements will drive the preferred strategy in 
terms of their allocation: the arena of competition and the expected marginal gain. In 
regional contests, the national incumbents tend to allocate intergovernmental transfers 
in order to break a tie in elections and gain the subnational government. Nevertheless, 
the strategy is different in the case of national elections. In this case, the incumbent will 
prefer to distribute more money in those regions where it performs better in order to 
mobilize their voters but, especially in those regions in which there are more seats to be 
won. Then, both strategies are following simultaneously by a center interested in 
maximizing its chances in national elections and securing as many subnational 
governments as possible. 
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